Last week Kenyan troops, in a surprising move, entered Somalia. The apparent trigger was the death of the ill elderly woman that Somali bandits had kidnapped from a Kenyan resort earlier. The Kenyan push has already made substantial gains along the border. The Transitional Federal Government seems even more convinced than ever that Al Shabaab has been beaten while convincing victories still haven’t taken place. Recent terrorist attacks in both Somalia and Kenya show that the Al Shabaab still poses a threat. Some fear that the Kenyan incursion will bring more violence and suffering to Somalia, but it could just be what was needed to push the Al Shabaab out of its position.

Summary

Kenya has for a long time suffered from the consequences of Somali insecurity. The burden that refugees bring with them and the recent direct threats to tourists make the Somali conflict a problem for Kenya. As a response to these threats Kenya has launched a military incursion into Somalia on three distinct fronts. Two of these lead unmistakably to Kismayo, the strategic port in hands of the Al Shabaab. So far the Kenyan offensive has not ran into major problems, enjoying the benefit of dependable air support, although troops closing in on Afmadow have been held back by muddy roads and flooding caused by the current rainy season in southern Somalia. The main questions on this offensive are just how far Kenya is willing to fight the Al Shabaab, and what its plans are for the liberated regions. Kenya could very well install the government of the claimed state of Azania in control of the region while delivering it military support. This would upset relationships with the TFG but would leave Kenya with more control over the security situation across its border. In the mean time Al Shabaab has been under considerable stress but shows no signs of having been defeated yet, the group remains a strong force that could continue to bring insecurity to the region.

The main reason Kenya is involved in the Somali conflict is easily explained by the many problems it suffers because of it. Kenya is overrun on a daily basis by Somali refugees that place a burden on Kenya’s development, refugee camps are overpopulated and radicalization among the Somali diaspora generates fears of terrorism activity in Kenya. There is also a very real security risk from Somali pirates and kidnappers who don’t only threaten Kenya’s maritime trade but have recently taken to the technique of kidnapping tourists from Kenyan resorts. These problems are all made possible in the lawless territory that Southern Somalia represents because of its civil war. Islamist rebels have ignored the criminal activity that threatens Kenya for years and they have been actively involved in the radicalization of diaspora. From time to time Al Shabaab forces have even clashed with Kenyan border troops. If Kenya were to get a reputation that it is not able to guarantee its own security, it would suffer greatly in the fields of tourism and development.

In response to these security threats, following the kidnapping of an elderly French woman and the inability to track the kidnappers, Kenya has sent its troops over the border in Somalia. The first troops crossed the border at Dhobley from where a road leads through Bilis Cooqaani to Kismayo, the important port city in the hands of Al Shabaab. Currently Kenyan troops in this area have been held back by heavy rains that during this season of the year cause flooded and muddy roads. Kenyan officers have claimed that their push to Afmadow, a strategically important town located near the road to Kismayo, will continue as the weather becomes dry. During the next weeks there are likely to be occasional gaps in the rain, but whether these will last long enough to allow the mobility of heavy equipment is unclear. The current rainy season could very well make most roads in the area difficult to travel until January.

After the initial push through Dhobley Kenyan troops also entered Somalia through Koolbiyow and El Waq. The crossing at Kolbiyow has already allowed Kenyan forces to take hold of Raas Kambooni and Oddo, a town slightly to the North. Raas Kambooni is a very strategic location as it is a common location for Al Shabaab to train recruits or withdraw to when losing their military struggle across the country. The push through Koolbiyow and Raas Kambooni is clearly aimed at the coastal route towards Kismayo. The area between these Kenyan positions and Kismayo is riddled with Al Shabaab training camps but these should not present a real challenge to the Kenyan offensive. The third prong of the offensive is located more to the North of the Kenyan-Somali border, in the Somali Gedo region. As on the other fronts Kenyan troops have already pushed on to the next towns in line, but it is unclear how this push will develop. Some sources claim that Kenyan troops will be heading for the town of Luuq, located to the North, while a more obvious conquest of Al Shabaab territory would take them to the South towards Baardheere, the regional capital which has been under Al Shabaab control for a long time. Both towns are located on the Juba River and have a strategic value.

The Kenyan ground offensives are heavily supported by Kenyan air assets that have been carrying out bombing raids ahead of the ground troops since the beginning of the offensive. Many positions that were taken up by Kenyan troops, usually accompanied by Somali troops and Raas Kambooni militia, were first attacked by Kenyan military helicopters and planes. Al Shabaab vacated many positions and allowed the Kenyan forces to overtake them without a fight. This weekend Kenyan planes reportedly dropped heavy ammunitions on the Kismayo seaport and airport, it is unclear whether this is aimed at halting the supply of Al Shabaab forces or at preventing Al Shabaab leadership from leaving the country.

The Kenyan operation is not without any risks. As soon as Kenya sent its forces across the border, Al Shabaab declared official war on Kenya and threatened with disastrous terrorist attacks. This morning a hand grenade exploded in a night club, this was possibly the work of Al Shabaab. While it is not the big enormous terrorist attack they had threatened with, this attack does demonstrate the short term risks that Kenya is taking with this operation. While on a longer term a stabilization of the border region is definitely bound to have a positive influence on Kenya’s security situation, the question is just how dangerous Al Shabaab can be on the short term.

The fact that will decide just how big an influence the longer term solution for the Kenyan-Somali border could have depends on the actual objectives of the Kenyan operation. There is a big difference in commitment and effects between an offensive that aims to eradicate Al Shabaab and an offensive that aims to push Al Shabaab away from the Kenyan border. It is unlikely that Kenya would attempt the same thing Ethiopia tried from 2006 until 2009. A war to destroy Al Shabaab would be too heavy a burden on Kenya as it would necessarily include taking part in a long stabilization operation that would put Kenya in the same Counter Insurgency battle that causes Ethiopia to withdraw from Somalia.

It is more likely that Kenya would push Al Shabaab across the Juba River that runs North-South. Kenya could possibly liberate villages East of the Juba in order to prevent Al Shabaab concentrations near the buffer zone it would have created but it is unlikely to push much further into Somalia. After this the question becomes what Kenya’s plan with this region is. Will it surrender control of it to the TFG or will it decide to keep its forces in the region to prevent the return of Al Shabaab? There is also the possibility that Kenya would honor its arrangements made with Dr. Mohamed Abdi Mohamed ‘Gandi’, former Minister of Defense of Somalia, who was elected president of Azania or Jubaland, a region that encompasses the territory from the Kenyan border on to the Juba with Kismayo as its capital. If this is the case it could harm relations between Kenya and the TFG but it would leave Kenya with more control over the security situation across its border with Somalia.

Some voices have claimed that the Kenyan invasion will bring involvement from western powers and that this would mean a turning point in their policies towards the Somali conflict. The actions they talk about is the United States claim that they could provide more support to Kenya for its current military operations, and a report that a French warship has shelled Al Shabaab positions South of Kismayo this weekend. The reality is that both countries have already been very involved in the Somali conflict, it is in no way a turning point. The United States have been actively supporting the TFG and other parties to the conflict with intelligence. They have also regularly conducted UAV strikes against Al Shabaab leadership. The French have also been actively supporting the TFG and have even conducted Special Forces raids on land against pirates. The fact that a French intelligence officer is still held by Al Shabaab and that the event that triggered the Kenyan assault involved a French citizen will certainly not cause France to be less involved. French security forces have already been challenged within France for the way they were unable to save the elderly French woman that died in captivity in Somalia. While this support to parties involved in the Somali conflict does matter, there is unlikely to be a big change that would strongly influence the outcome of events in Somalia.

Another common idea that has formed, over the last months since the Al Shabaab withdrawal from Mogadishu and especially now since the Kenyan invasion, is the idea that Al Shabaab is in a bad shape and is practically beaten. The reality is that over the course of the last few months Al Shabaab has not suffered extreme losses. The rebel group is in a struggle for its survival but such is the nature of its existence. Forced recruitment has gone up dramatically while defections and losses have not. The withdrawal from the Mogadishu frontline has saved Al Shabaab a lot of human losses and resources that it is now able to spend otherwise. If anything has caused harm to Al Shabaab it has most likely been the constant threat of aerial attacks on their leadership. The leadership is clearly less visible than before and could be doing its best to avoid detection. The decapitation strategy is obviously putting the necessary stress on Islamist operations.

This, however, does not mean that Al Shabaab is defeated. It continues to be a military force that matters in the Somali conflict. In the central regions of Somalia the group is not even challenged, and anywhere else it has decided to give up territory in order to gain freedom of operation. Even in Juba, where Al Shabaab has been withdrawing in front of the Kenyan assault, this approach has now put Al Shabaab in a more advantageous position for the approaching battle for Afmadow. While Kenyan and Somali troops have had to halt their approach, Al Shabaab forces have been receiving reinforcements and have spent time building defensive structures. Kenyan forces, accompanied by Somali troops and anti-Shabaab militia definitely have the capabilities to defeat the Islamist rebels but it is not yet an accomplished fact.