Somalia has recently made the headlines all over the world. The attention and response to the famine in Somalia, as well as the improving situation in Mogadishu, has allowed the Somali government to strengthen ties with international organizations and other states. While the humanitarian situation has taken the forefront, and while some have called out victory after the withdrawal of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu, the conflict in Southern Somalia rages on and Al Shabaab is far from collapsing and giving up control of the areas it claims.

Summary

Since Al Shabaab withdrew from the capital the government has been unable to guarantee security within the capital. Ambushes and terrorist attacks have happened and are likely to keep happening in the near future. In other regions of South Somalia Islamist forces have retaken the offensive and keep a constant pressure on government troops and their allies. While fighting this war the government is also overloaded with managing the humanitarian disaster in Somalia. Famine is putting a huge stress on Somalia and many victims can not be reached in territories under Al Shabaab control. Foreign forces have increased their involvement in the Somali conflict through air strikes and drone coverage of South Somalia. While this could put a much needed pressure on the activities of the Al Shabaab leadership, it has already brought a certain amount of collateral damage with it.

In August Al Shabaab rebels withdrew their forces from the frontlines in Mogadishu. Until that moment the capital had been literally split in half by a frontline that divided the government-controlled territory from that under control of the Islamist rebels. Soon after this withdrawal certain members of the Transitional Federal Government were quick to claim victory over the Al Shabaab. Some analysts even claimed that being unable to hold on to Mogadishu was a sign of weakness and signaled the oncoming collapse of the Islamist rebel movement. While it is true that the TFG has gained a certain freedom by being able to assert more control over its own capital, the fight against the Al Shabaab is all but over. Ambushes of government troops and bomb attacks have been mounted within Mogadishu ever since the retreat. What used to be a conventional conflict over the capital has now transformed once again into a conflict dominated by guerilla tactics. While the government can now officially claim control over the capital, the fight it now faces is one it is ill-equipped for. The TFG troops, backed by the AMISOM peacekeeping force, was already suffering problems controlling the conventional frontline in Mogadishu before, but it can only encounter more problems trying to control the hidden Al Shabaab activity it faces now. The car bomb explosion that took place near government buildings at the K4 point in Mogadishu on the morning of the publication of this article only proves the inability for the government to transform the current situation into security.

One must keep in mind, of course, that the TFG is not only faced with the quest of securing Mogadishu and in fact all of the country. The famine that rages through the country has brought an insane amount of pressure on the government that now needs to provide food aid, security for aid agencies and safe environments for internally displaced persons. While the international community has been slow to react to the signs of famine at first, the effort it has mounted at this point in time is enormous. Somalis in camps in Kenya and Ethiopia as well as those near Mogadishu are finding their way to food aid. The regions struck hardest by the famine are, however, under control of the Al Shabaab and providing food to people there proves to be difficult. While some initiatives have been successful, reports of Al Shabaab forces claiming food deliveries and detaining people that seek to leave territory under their control are many. Problems of diverted food aid occur in all parts of Somalia, but the situation in areas under Islamist control is worrying. The TFG’s fight for security is not only a struggle for political control, but also presents a humanitarian aspect by the necessity to open up more regions of Somalia to urgently needed food aid and sustainable development.

Outside of Mogadishu the government has also been facing a very difficult military situation. In the west of the country the TFG still has certain active fronts after an offensive there had ground to a halt earlier this year. TFG troops and Ahla Sunna militia defend a region in Gedo bordering Kenya and Ethiopia as well as the border town of Dhobley along with the Raas Kambooni Brigade in the Lower Juba region. The Gedo offensive has so far still failed to push on to Baardheere, the obvious and announced next target of this military push. Instead Al Shabaab forces have started to challenge the government presence in Luuq, Garbaharey and even further into the government bridgehead in Belet Haawo. Recent attacks mounted by Al Shabaab have shown that TFG troops and their allies are unable to push the Al Shabaab back. Instead the Al Shabaab has regained the initiative in these regions and keeps a constant pressure on the government troops that limits them from expanding their control, it barely allows them to hold on to the territory they have gained. In the Lower Juba region a fierce Al Shabaab attack has even forced government troops and the Raas Kambooni Brigade to abandon the border town of Dhobley only to retake it a day later. Al Shabaab forces are reported to remain active in all regions surrounding these government positions and further attacks could happen at any given time.

In the central regions of the country strategic towns remain the subject of fierce opposition from both sides. In the Hiiraan region the Al Shabaab control over Belet Weyne is threatened by maneuvers by TFG forces, Ahla Sunna militia and the Shabelle Valley militia. Ahla Sunna fighters have been able to gain control of parts of the town, including the airport south of the main part of town. All sides have been making deliberate preparations for ongoing combat and the situation in Belet Weyne is expected to lead to more fighting even though Al Shabaab has been able to stand its ground against many offensives in Belet Weyne. In the Galguduud region Islamist forces have taken a strategic town near Dhusamareeb and even succeeded at briefly overtaking Dhusamareeb itself. This morning Ahla Sunna fighters that previously controlled the town were able to regain control after Al Shabaab forces had vacated their positions during the night. The position of Al Shabaab in Galguduud seems to have become stronger and it could be within their possibilities to gain full control of the region.

In the semi-autonomous region of Puntland, which has usually been spared of real fighting between government forces and Islamist rebels, militias linked to Al Shabaab have started waging a conventional struggle against Puntland forces. Targetted killings that are suspected to be the work of Al Shabaab have been taking place in Puntland for quite some time, but the recent military operations in the mountains in North Puntland are a worrying evolution. The fighting is nowhere near the intensity and scale of that in South Somalia but if Puntland does not manage to control this activity it may lose its advantage of being the more stable region in the Somali federation.

Another interesting development in the Somali conflict is the growing involvement of outside forces. A number of airstrikes and drone strikes, as well as numerous incidents involving crashed drones, have shown that capabilities that are not accessible by the TFG are being used in the war against the Al Shabaab. According to reports some of these strikes happen in coordination with AMISOM and the TFG and target Al Shabaab leadership and training facilities. Due to a lack of intelligence on what exactly is happening on the ground in Somalia these airstrikes have come to be known as an instrument of blunt force that has lead to numerous mishaps and civilian casualties. Although at times drone strikes and airstrikes have proven extremely useful against Al Shabaab, the recent surge in volume of such attacks has brought with it a certain amount of collateral damage. The airstrikes are usually attributed to the air forces of Kenya, Ethiopia or the United States. All of these countries have been known to operate in Somali air space in the past. The recent kidnapping across the Kenyan border provide a growing incentive for the Kenyan government to become involved in the fight against the Islamist rebels in Somalia. The activity of drones above Somalia could be partially explained by the delivery of unarmed drones to Uganda and Burundi, which make up the AMISOM peacekeeping force in Mogadishu, as part of a larger 45 million dollar military aid package. While these unarmed UAV could explain the sudden trend of drones falling from the sky, it does not explain strikes executed by drones which can only be expected to be the work of the United States military in support of the TFG.

As can be seen from the evolutions across the theater of the Somali conflict, the Islamist withdrawal from Mogadishu has not brought an end to the war at all. On the contrary, it seems that the tactical withdrawal has allowed Al Shabaab to reposition its troops and present a larger threat to government allied forces in other regions of South Somalia. The ambushes during the last months and the large bomb attack this morning also show that the Al Shabaab still has reach within the city of Mogadishu, and even after the withdrawal the TFG is unable to secure the capital. From the government side military operations in the rest of the country remain uncoordinated and unsuccessful, the sustainability of gains made earlier this year in the Gedo and Lower Juba regions is now to be doubted even more than before. The Al Shabaab forces seem to have retaken the offensive in the conflict, and the recent history of the conflict has shown that the government forces are usually unable to stand their ground in such a situation. The campaign of airstrikes and drone activity could have an effect on Islamist freedom of operation as it forces executive leadership to stay in hiding, limiting their ability to command and causing dissatisfaction amongst Al Shabaab forces.